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JURISDICTION 
This is the response to an appeal and a cross-appeal from 
the Decree of Divorce entered in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on January 26, 1987. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g), (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. through IV. 
The Statement of the Issues as presented by Plaintiff/ 
Appellant is accurate so far as stated, but it fails to point out 
the main issue of the case. This issue is whether the trial 
court erroneously avoided the rightful award of alimony to 
Defendant/Respondent after the termination of twenty-seven years 
of marriage. 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
30-3-5 Disposition of property—Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children—Court to have continuing jurisdic-
tion—Custody and visitation—Termination of alimony— 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
and parties. 
• • . . 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the 
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parties, the custody of the children and their support, mainten-
ance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property 
as is reasonable and necessary. 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
78-45-3 Duty of Man, 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall support 
his wife when she is in need. 
78-45-2(4) Definitions, 
"Child" means the son or daughter under the age of 
eighteen years and a son or daughter of whatever age who is 
incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient 
means. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case wherein the trial court ordered the 
husband to pay $650.00 per month in child support until the 
parties' minor child reaches the age of twenty-five and awarded 
the wife $1,00 per year alimony. Both awards are to be reviewed 
when the minor child reaches twenty-five. The husband is appeal-
ing the amount and duration of the child support awards as well 
as the award of attorney's fees. In addition, he is appealing 
the inclusion of amounts representing the estimated real estate 
commission and closing costs in determining his interest in the 
marital home's equity. The wife is cross-appealing the alimony 
provisions. 
This was a twenty-seven year marriage, (Record p.25.) in 
which Mrs. Asper worked during the first couple of years to 
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assist her husband in earning his masters degree in engineering. 
(.Id.) While Mrs. Asper has worked throughout her marriage, she 
has never received any formal education and is not qualified for 
anything but unskilled employment. (3^ 3.) She is currently 
working for her brother, and her net income is approximately 
$1,100.00 per month. (Record p.66.) Her expenses are $2,095.00 
per month. (Record p. 22, 11. 11 through 14.) On the other hand, 
Mr. Asper earns a gross monthly salary of $3,326.27. (Record p. 
66.) His net income is $2,400.00 per month, (Record p. 144, 11. 
2-7), with the inclusion of the amounts Mr. Asper has voluntarily 
authorized be directed to a savings account. (Record p. 141, 
1. 20 through p. 142, 1. 5.) 
In addition to her lack of training and formal education, 
Ane Asper is only able to work part time due to the special needs 
of her minor daughter, Connie. (Record p. 25, 11. 22-24.) Connie 
Asper, a seventeen year old child of the parties, is inflicted 
with juvenile rheumatoid arthritis resulting in significant 
deformity and limited mobility. She is incapable of gainful 
employment without further education in specialized job skills. 
(Record p. 8, 11. 15 through 23.) 
During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the parties 
stipulated through counsel (Mr. Asper's first attorney) to 
temporary support and therefore no order was issued. Mr. Asper 
agreed to pay $250.00 per month temporary child support and also 
to make the $330.00 per month mortgage payment on the parties' 
home. (Record p. 143, 11. 10-13.) Later, Mr. Asper unilaterally 
3 
decided to discontinue making these payments, and as a result, 
Mrs. Asper's counsel requested and received an order that any 
alimony and child support be retroactive to September 16. 
(Record p. 143, 11. 10-20.) 
The parties came before the Honorable David B. Dee on two 
separate occasions—September 16, 1986 and November 20, 1986. At 
these hearings, the court only received evidence proffered by way 
of stipulation of the parties, and as a result, there was no 
testimony taken other than to establish grounds for the divorce. 
Mrs. Asper contended that she needed $700.00 per month from Mr. 
Asper in order to maintain a decent standard of living for 
herself and her daughter. (Record p. 144, 1. 25 through p. 145, 
1. 5.) She requested $350.00 per month in alimony and $350.00 
per month child support. (Record p. 128, 1. 2.) Although 
recognizing the financial needs of Mrs. Asper, the court expressed 
concern that if alimony were awarded, it would go on forever. 
For example, the court stated: 
The Court: You're talking—you're talking 
me to a position where you're 
talking about alimony. And 
that's why I said because of 
this position your client is 
taking, alimony goes on 
forever. 
The Court: The Supreme Court doesn't let 
us do what we used to do. 
Unless we can find some way to 
go around what they ruled, 
alimony is given to somebody 
for five years, say until this 
child is 18 or 21, five years 
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would be 22, and then ceases, 
because the situation has been 
adjusted so the child is now 
an adult. It goes on forever— 
The Court: --unless she gets remarried. 
And that's because Justice 
Durham thinks women have had 
the short end of this so many 
years it's time to get even. 
So when you start tampering 
with alimony, you're talking 
about a forever proposition. 
It never ends. When your 
client is 99, your client will 
still be paying alimony. If 
you get into that box, you're 
still in it. That's what I 
said to you when we were 
talking informally, out of the 
presence of your clients, 
otherwise you'll have a 
problem that will last forever. 
And she doesn't mind. 
(Record p. 132, 1. 14 through p. 133, 1. 11.) At the conclusion 
of the two days of hearings, the court took the matter under 
advisement. (Record p. 149, 1. 22 through p. 150, 1. 12.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Asper was ordered to pay $650.00 per month child 
support and $1.00 per year alimony. (Record p. 79.) 
In addition, the court awarded Mrs. Asper the parties' home 
subject to the mortgage which she must assume and pay. (Record 
p. 82.) Mr. Asper was awarded a lien on the property for one-half 
of the equity in the home as of the date of the divorce after 
allowance was made for payment of estimated real estate commis-
sions and closing costs. (]j3.) This equity is due upon the first 
to occur of the following: sale of the home, Mrs. Asper's 
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remarriage, or when the parties' minor child reaches the age of 
twenty-five years. (Id.) 
In addition, the court awarded Mrs. Asper $6,000.00 in 
attorney's fees. (Record p. 83.) This sum was the result of the 
time and effort required by Mrs. Asper's counsel due to Mr. 
Asper's employment of three separate attorneys prior to trial. 
(Record p. 138, 11. 16-23.) Evidence was presented by affidavit 
as to the reasonableness of the amounts charged as well as the 
amount of time required. (Record p. 140, 11. 12-19.) At no time 
did Mr. Asper's attorney object to either. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. 
The trial court did consider sufficient evidence and did 
make detailed findings of facts as to the parties' minor child's 
physical disabilities and inability to support herself after the 
age of majority. 
II. 
At all times material herein, the parties agreed to equally 
divide the equity in the marital home at the time of the divorce, 
and Mr. Asper agreed to accept a lien for this amount. The 
inclusion of the real estate commission and closing costs in 
determining the value of the lien was within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Mr. Asper cannot now request the parties' 
marital home be appraised at the time of sale to determine his 
one-half interest. 
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III. 
The award of attorneyfs fees to Mrs. Asper was correctly 
based on her financial need in defending this action, and they 
are reasonable under the circumstances surrounding this case. 
IV. 
With regard to the cross-appeal, this was a twenty-seven 
year marriage wherein Mrs. Asper worked to help her husband 
obtain his master's degree in engineering. She, however, has no 
formal training and is only qualified for unskilled employment. 
In awarding $650.00 per month child support, the trial court 
showed it recognized the overall financial needs of Mrs. Asper 
(her proffer was $700.00 per month), but the classification of 
the entire sum as child support was a result of the court's 
efforts to protect Mr. Asper from what the court erroneously 
perceived was the permanence of alimony. Mr. Asper should be 
required to pay $350.00 per month child support to be reviewed 
when the parties' minor child reaches a specified age, and 
$350.00 per month alimony. 
V. 
As Mr. Asper's arguments on appeal are without merit, and 
his position has required Mrs. Asper to cross-appeal the division 
of the total award between child support and alimony, Mrs. Asper 
is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees and costs associ-
ated with this appeal. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACTS SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT 
AND INSURANCE PROGRAMS TO AGE TWENTY-FIVE. 
A trial court has broad equitable authority to order support 
for a child over eighteen years of age who cannot earn a living 
and is without sufficient means of self support. The Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act requires every man to support his 
child in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987), and defines "child" as 
"a son or daughter under the age of eighteen years and a son or 
daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a 
living and without sufficient means." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(4). 
As summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in Garrand v. Garrand, 
615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980), this code section: 
[E]xpressly fixes responsibility for support 
of a child (of whatever age who is incapaci-
tated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means) upon his parents. . . . 
[T]his court has recognized that when a child 
is so limited, either physically or mentally, 
that he is unable to support himself when he 
reaches his age of majority, his parents may 
be required to provide support beyond that 
time. Td. at 423 (footnotes omitted). 
In addition, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953), the 
court has broad equitable powers in "safeguarding the interest 
and welfare of children." Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 528 (Utah 
1976) . In the case presently before this court, Appellee, Ann 
Asper, concurs with Alfred Asper in that, because the court's 
authority is discretionary, there must be specific findings of 
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special or unusual circumstances justifying such an award beyond 
the age of majority. Indeed, support awarded beyond the age of 
twenty-one has been reversed for failure of the trial court to 
make such specified findings. See, Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 
435 (Utah 1978); and Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah 
1978) . 
However, contrary to Alfred Asper's contentions, Judge David 
B. Dee did make the requisite findings of special or unusual 
circumstances, and these were based upon adequate evidence before 
the court. The trial court accepted into evidence a letter 
outlining Dr. John Ward's professional opinion of Connie Asper!s 
physical ability to support herself, and Mr. Asper did not object 
to the admission of this letter in lieu of Dr. Ward's testimony 
at the hearing. (Record p. 127, 11. 15 thru 18.). Dr. Ward is a 
professor of medicine at the University of Utah and is Chief of 
the Division of Rheumatology. He has been involved in the 
treatment of Connie's condition since 1974. This letter is a 
detailed outline of Connie's condition. In pertinent part it 
reads: 
Connie Lynne Asper is a 16 year-old student 
who I have followed since 1974 for juvenile 
rheumatoid arthritis. Connie continues to 
have evidence of chronic active arthritis 
with significant deformity, she has involve-
ment of hands with incomplete fist formation, 
wrists with limited mobility, reduction of 
shoulder motion, very limited cervical spine 
[neck] motion with essentially no ability to 
extend the neck and rotation limited to 30 
degrees, limited extension of the hips, 
limited mobility of knees, swelling and 
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tenderness of the ankles, and forefoot 
deformity. 
While Connie is capable of self-care and 
usual activities, it is unlikely that she can 
be competitively employed in the current job 
market. Her physical disabilities would 
limit her to a very sedentary position and 
stamina and dexterity would be sincerely 
limited. Therefore, it is my opinion that 
Connie should be considered permanently 
disabled pending such time that she is able 
to gain specific job skills through an 
educational process which will prepare her 
for competition in the job market. 
Based upon this expert opinion by a doctor personally 
involved in treating Connie for over twelve years, Judge David B. 
Dee made the following statements in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
3. The parties to this action are the 
parents of three (3) children, one of whom is 
under the age of majority, Connie Lynne 
Asper, a female, age 17, born September 19, 
1969, and who currently resides with Defendant. 
Since 1974, Connie has been and is now 
afflicted with juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, 
with significant deformity of hands, fists, 
wrists and feet, and with limited mobility of 
shoulder, neck, hips and knees and, as such, 
the Court finds that she is permanently 
disabled and is not able to be competitively 
employed in the current job market, and 
Connie should be considered permanently 
disabled pending such time that she is able 
to gain specific job skills. 
4. Plaintiff earns a gross monthly salary 
of $3,326.27, and should pay $650.00 per 
month child support to Defendant for the 
benefit of Connie, who has special needs, 
until she reaches the age of twenty-five 
(25), with the first payment to be made on 
September 16, 1986, and like payments on the 
15th day of each month thereafter. 
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Therefore, evidence was considered by the trial court and findings 
of special circumstances duly noted. In addition, while the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law expressly provide for 
review of this award when Connie reaches age twenty-five, Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1953), provides for the court's continuing 
jurisdiction to modify child support awards at any time. There-
fore, should Connie become self-sufficient and able to earn a 
living prior to her twenty-fifth birthday, the support award can 
be modified at that time. As a result, the award of child 
support to Connie Asper until she reaches the age of twenty-five 
was not an abuse of discretion and should be upheld on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CALCULATING 
THE EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOME. 
Mr. Asper's argument in appealing the award of equity in the 
marital home is confusing. He begins by claiming as error the 
inclusion of one-half of the estimated real estate commissions 
and closing costs in the determination of his interest in the 
equity. Mr. Asper then concludes with a request that the Decree 
be amended to award him one-half of the actual sale price of the 
home. However, the inclusion of the commissions and closing 
costs is within the discretion of the trial court, and the court 
did not abuse its discretion in this case. In addition, at no 
time prior to this appeal has Mr. Asper requested one-half of the 
sale price of the home. Because claims not raised at trial 
cannot be considered on appeal, Mr. Asper cannot now raise this 
issue. 
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At all times material herein, the parties agreed to divide 
equally at the time of trial the equity in their home. The 
parties also agreed that Mr. Asper would receive an equitable 
lien representing his one-half share. First, the complaint filed 
by Mr. Asper only requested the following: 
10. The parties acquired a home and lot 
located [at] 1332 Colonial Drive, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Defendant should be awarded the 
use and possession of said home subject to an 
equitable lien in Plaintiff to be paid upon 
the happening of the following triggering 
events: Defendant's remarriage or cohabita-
tion with a man not her spouse; upon the 
youngest child reaching the age of 18; 
Defendant's ceasing to use the property as 
her primary residence; sale of the property. 
In the event of Defendant's death, said home 
should be awarded to Plaintiff. Defendant 
should also hold Plaintiff harmless from any 
and all indebtedness owing on said property. 
(Record p. 3-4 (emphasis added).) Then, at trial, Mr. Asper 
repeated his offer and a request for a present valuation of the 
equity in the home. His counsel stated: 
MR. GUYON: . . . Essentially Mr. Asper's 
interest in the home would be 
determined right at the 
present time in the form of a 
lien which would be payable 
upon any contingencies of 
course the Court wants to 
impose. 
(Record p. 131, 11. 4-8 (emphasis added).) The final division of 
the possession and equity of the marital home reflected Mr. 
Asper's requests and position at trial. 
Defendant should be awarded the home, subject 
to the mortgage which Defendant should pay as 
the same becomes due, and Plaintiff should 
have a lien against the property for one-half 
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of the equity, after allowance for payment of 
real estate commissions and closing costs 
calculated at 8 % of the present value of the 
home, or a lien in the amount of $35,214.50 
for his share of the equity. Plaintiff's 
equity shall be due upon whichever of the 
following events first occurs: sale of the 
home, Defendant's remarriage, or when Connie 
reaches the age of twenty-five years. 
Plaintiff's lien shall not bear interest. 
(Record p. 70 (emphasis added).) This final disposition of the 
equity is consistent with Mr. Asper's position throughout the 
proceedings. At no time did he request the house be valued at 
the time of sale, and he cannot now raise this issue on appeal. 
As reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in Bangerter v. Poulton, 
653 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983), "It is axiomatic that defenses and 
claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal." Ij3. at 102. 
Therefore, Mr. Asper cannot request one-half of the sale 
price of the parties' marital home. In addition, the trial court 
did not err in calculating the amount of Mr. Asper's lien. As 
the parties agreed to evenly divide the equity subject to mortgage 
payments made by Mrs. Asper, fairness requires that the parties 
both assume one-half of the financial obligations upon sale of 
the home. Therefore, the trial court did not err in calculating 
the parties' respective interests in the marital home, and its 
decision should be upheld on appeal. 
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POINT III 
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO AWARD 
MRS. ASPER $6,000.00 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Courts have the authority, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-3 (1953) to award sums so as "to enable such party to 
prosecute or defend the action." There are threshold require-
ments for such an award, and these were outlined by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984). There 
the court stated: 
In divorce cases, awards of attorney's fees 
must be supported by evidence which shows 
that the requested award is reasonable. 
Relevant factors of reasonableness include 
'the necessity of the number of hours dedi-
cated, the reasonableness of the rate charged 
in light of the difficulty of the case and 
the result accomplished, and the rates 
commonly charged for divorce actions in the 
community.' Also, the party requesting the 
award must show financial need. Where 
reasonableness of the award or financial need 
have not been shown, we have reversed awards 
of attorney's fees. 
Id. at 864 (citation omitted). Therefore, there are two basic 
requirements necessary for an award of attorney's fees: (1) 
Reasonableness, and (2) financial need. Both of these factors 
have been met in the present case. Mrs. Asper's counsel, Frank 
J. Gustin, submitted an affidavit as to the activities undertaken 
on behalf of Mrs. Asper. These included document preparation, 
client conferences and hearings. The rates charged were equal to 
those commonly charged for divorce cases in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
by attorneys with equal experience and expertice. Extra hours 
were required in this case due to Mr. Asper's need to employ 
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three different attorneys prior to trial. Mrs. Asper was in no 
way responsible for these circumstances but has incurred detriment 
as a direct result thereof. To compensate for this unusual 
factor, Mrs. Asper1s counsel suggested that the amount of attor-
ney's fees be paid out at the time the house is sold and the 
equity divided. (Record p. 145, 11. 6 thru 21.) 
Finally, evidence was presented that Mrs. Asperfs monthly 
net income, at $1,100.00, (Record p. 144, 1. 25) was insufficient 
to meet her monthly expenses of $2,095.00. (Record p. 141, 11. 11 
thru 14.) On the other hand, Mr. Asper earns a gross monthly 
salary of $3,326.27. While his statement of expenses was chal-
lenged as inflated by Mrs. Asper at the hearing, (Record p. 142, 
1. 11 through p. 25, 1. 11), he is at least comfortably able to 
meet his expenses. As a result, Mrs. Asper did establish the 
requirements of reasonableness and financial need, and, therefore, 
it was not an abuse of discretion to award her attorney's fees to 
assist her in defending the action brought by Mr. Asper. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO AWARD ALIMONY TO MRS. ASPER. 
Alimony is awarded in an effort to, as nearly as possible, 
maintain the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the 
marriage. The court must consider all relevant factors affecting 
one spouse's ability to provide for herself and the other's 
ability to pay support. As summarized by the Utah Supreme Court 
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in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985): 
An alimony award should, as far as possible, 
equalize the parties1 respective standards 
of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. In determining 
the amount of alimony to be awarded, it was 
necessary for the trial court to consider the 
financial condition and needs of the plaintiff, 
her ability to produce a sufficient income 
for herself, and the ability of the defendant 
to provide support. 
Id. at 566 (footnotes omitted). Pursuant to this standard, the 
lower court abused its discretion in failing to award alimony to 
Mrs. Asper. 
Evidence was provided through documentation and at the 
hearing to show Mrs. Asper!s need for additional support and Mr. 
Asper's ability to so provide. Mrs. Asper currently works thirty 
hours per week and makes $1,100.00 per month. Her expenses total 
$2,095.00 per month. She is unable to work full time due to the 
care required by her daughter Connie who has juvenile rheumatoid 
arthritis. (Record p. 25, 11. 22-24.) Mr. Asper earns a gross 
monthly salary of $3,326.00, and his net income is $2,400.00 
(Record p. 138, 11. 10-12) with the inclusion of amounts Mr. 
Asper has chosen to divert to savings for his pension fund. 
(Record p. 141, 11. 20-23.) His claimed expenses were disputed 
as inflated by Mrs. Asper. (Record p. 142, 1. 11 through p. 144, 
1. 1.) 
Based on these figures, Mrs. Asper requested $350.00 in 
child support (Record p. 128, 1. 2) and $350.00 in alimony for a 
total award of $700.00. (Record p. 144, 11. 2-4.) Instead, Judge 
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Dee decided to award $650.00 in child support for Connie to the 
age of twenty-five. This award shows that while recognizing Mrs. 
Asper's overall financial needs, the court was reluctant to award 
alimony. Statements by the court suggest this decision was the 
result of the court's effort to avoid what it perceived was the 
permanency of alimony. At the hearing, the court expressed 
concern about its erroneous assumption that an alimony award goes 
on forever: 
THE COURT: . . . But I think the law in the 
State of Utah is if you award alimony, and 
I'm not talking about special circumstances, 
and this is a special circumstance with a 
disabled child, you never get off of it. It 
doesn't matter what you think about it. 
That's the position I'm going to take in this 
case. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: So if you talk about alimony, 
you're talking about forever. 
(Record p. 133, 11. 17-25.) Mrs. Asper respectfully points out 
that this is not a correct summary of the law. Instead, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, an award of alimony for an unspecified 
period of time continues until automatically terminated by 
remarriage or co-habitation. In addition, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(3) (1953), the court retains jurisdiction to modify an 
alimony award when there has been a material change of circum-
stances. As a result, a party is never permanently locked into 
paying alimony. In this case, it appears from the record that 
the court's misconstruction of alimony law led him to fashion the 
unique child support and alimony award of $650.00 per month and 
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$1.00 per year respectively. This decision was an abuse of 
discretion in light of Mrs. Asperfs circumstances. Her expenses 
exceed her income by $995.00. She cannot work more hours as she 
must help Connie with the ordinary function of day-to-day living. 
In addition, this was a twenty-seven year marriage. When the 
parties were first married, Mrs. Asper worked to help Mr. Asper 
get his masterfs degree in engineering. While she continued to 
work throughout her marriage, she does not have any formal 
education; and, therefore, she is only qualified for unskilled 
employment. 
The failure to award extended alimony in a similar situation 
was held to be an abuse of discretion in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 
564, (Utah 1985). In Olson, the parties had been married for 
twenty-three years and had six children, three of whom were 
minors. Mrs. Olson had no formal education and had no work 
experience. The court awarded her $1,600.00 per month alimony 
for a period of two years. On review, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
We agree, however, with the plaintiff's 
contention that the court's order that 
alimony terminate after two years was a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. As we 
stated in Jones v. Jones, '[t]his is simply 
not the sort of situation in which a decreas-
ing rehabilitative alimony award is appro-
priate. ' Married soon after graduation from 
high school, the plaintiff's primary occupa-
tion during the twenty-odd year marriage, was 
caring for the parties' home and six children. 
Having worked only minor clerical jobs for 
two brief periods over twenty years apart, 
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she has no reasonable expectation of obtaining 
employment two years hence that will enable 
her to support herself at a standard of 
living even approaching that which she had 
during the marriage. Continuing spousal 
maintenance is mandated by these circum-
stances. Therefore, under our discretionary 
power to modify the final decree in a divorce 
action, we hereby modify the decree of 
divorce in this case to provide for permanent 
alimony from defendant to plaintiff. Against 
should the circumstances change in the 
future, the defendant may petition the court 
to modify the decree under its continuing 
jurisdiction. 
704 P.2d at 567 (emphasis added). Olson is applicable to the 
case now before this Court. While Mrs. Asper does have work 
experience, she does not have a formal education so as to get a 
job in order to maintain her accustomed standard of living or 
even to meet her monthly expenses. Further, unlike Mrs. Olson, 
she has a daughter who needs extra time and attention, thus 
precluding many job opportunities. Therefore, given all of the 
circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to fail 
to award alimony to Mrs. Asper. 
This Court has the authority to determine and award a 
substitute remedy for that of the trial court's. Pursuant to 
Rule 30(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals this Court 
is empowered to modify any judgment or order from which a party 
appeals. In Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982) the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the nature of their authority to 
modify judgments: 
It is the duty and preogative of this Court 
in equity matters, where the occasion warrants, 
and after a review of both the facts and the 
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law, to fashion its own remedy as a substitute 
for the judgment of the trial court, but that 
court's actions should only be disturbed to 
prevent manifest injustice. 
Id. at 1019. In view of the practical implications resulting 
from the labels given to support awards, and under the facts in 
this case, Mrs. Asper requests the court to modify the trial 
court's total financial award and order Mr. Asper to pay $350.00 
per month child support and $350.00 per month alimony. This 
division would be consistent with Mrs. Asper's overall financial 
need as well as the total support award ordered by the trial 
court. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT ANE ASPER IS ENTITLED TO 
AN AWARD OF HER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPEAL. 
Mr. Asper's appeal of the trial court's decision on the 
awards of child support to age twenty-five, the equity in the 
marital home and attorney's fees is without merit. In addition, 
it was clear that the trial court recognized the overall financial 
need of Mrs. Asper to be in the range of $700.00 as requested by 
her at trial. Therefore, Mr. Asper's appeal of the total finan-
cial award is also without merit. To defend against the allega-
tion that the court award of child support was excessive, Mrs. 
Asper was pressed to cross-appeal the alimony provisions and 
request this court to modify the division of the total award 
between child support and alimony. Therefore, Mrs. Asper requests 
this court to award her attorney's fees associated with this 
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appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court concluded in Carter v. Carter, 
584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978) : 
However, the defendant argues that inasmuch 
as the plaintiff was unwilling to abide by 
the trial court's judgment, and that she has 
been put to the necessity of defending this 
appeal, the plaintiff should have to bear the 
costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's 
fees for her counsel. We agree with the 
reasonableness and propriety of her request. 
Id. at 906 (footnote omitted). (See also, Ehninger v. Ehninger, 
569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977) .) 
In this case, Mrs. Asper has an income of $1,100.00 per 
month, $995.00 less than her monthly expenses. Mr. Asper nets 
approximately $2,400.00 per month. The trial court recognized 
the appropriateness of a total financial award to Mrs. Asper of 
$650.00 per month. As a result, fairness requires that Mrs. 
Asper not be required to deplete her limited assets in demonstrat-
ing that this appeal is without merit. Therefore, Mrs. Asper 
requests this court to remand to the trial court for determination 
of an award of her attorney's fees and costs associated with this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This started out as a simple divorce case. The parties were 
married for twenty-seven years and have a minor child who is 
disabled by arthritis. Mrs. Asper helped her husband obtain his 
master's degree, and as a result Mr. Asper nets $2,400.00 per 
month by way of income as an engineer at Hill Air Force Base. 
Mrs. Asper has no formal education, and she currently works for 
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her brother. Her net income is $1,100.00 per month, and her 
expenses are $2,095.00 per month. The court found and concluded 
that Mrs. Asper needs $650.00 per month support from her husband. 
While the facts are straightforward, the case has not been; 
and Mrs. Asper requests this Court to put an end to the 
unwarranted time, money and energy devoted to it as a result of 
Mr. Asperfs efforts to avoid his financial responsibilities. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Asper employed three separate attorneys in 
this effort, thus hampering consistency and causing increased 
legal fees for Mrs. Asper. The trial court's legal miscon-
ceptions led to a convoluted division of support award between 
child support and alimony even though the overall financial award 
was reasonable in view of the needs of Mrs. Asper and her disabled 
minor daughter who turned eighteen on September 19, 1987. 
This Court should modify the total financial award to 
provide for $350.00 per month in child support to be reviewed as 
provided by the trial court when Connie reaches the age of 
twenty-five years and to award her $350.00 per month in alimony. 
In addition, Mrs. Asper requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court on all other issues and award her the attorney's fees 
incurred herewith. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ^ day of October, 1987. 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
By 
Frank J . GtfStin (USB# A1279) 
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